The Naga Question: How Manipur’s Governance Failure Fuels Ethnic Cleansing by Proxy

Imphal/Ukhrul, April 2026 – When the first gunshots rang out across Litan village at 6:03 PM on Easter Sunday, 68-year-old Thino Konyak was preparing for the evening prayer service. By the time the firing stopped five hours later, his community had joined the growing list of Naga villages in Manipur’s Ukhrul district that have become targets in what analysts now describe as a "state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing by proxy." The attacks—carried out by Kuki militant groups operating under a controversial Suspension of Operation (SoO) agreement with the Indian government—represent more than just another flare-up in Manipur’s decades-old ethnic tensions. They expose a dangerous collusion between armed non-state actors and systemic governance failures that threaten to redraw the region’s demographic and political map.

The Architecture of Impunity: How SoO Agreements Became Weapons of War

From Ceasefire to Covert Offensive

The Suspension of Operation agreements, originally designed as confidence-building measures between the Indian state and insurgent groups, have metamorphosed into something far more sinister in Manipur’s context. Signed between 2008 and 2018 with 25 Kuki militant factions—including the Kuki National Army (KNA) and United People’s Front (UPF)—these agreements were meant to freeze hostilities while political negotiations progressed. Instead, they have created what security analyst Bibhu Prasad Routray terms "a parallel military infrastructure with state patronage."

Under the SoO framework, Kuki militants retain their arms (supposedly in designated "camps"), receive monthly stipends from the government (ranging from ₹3,000 to ₹6,000 per cadre), and operate with near-total impunity. A 2025 South Asia Terrorism Portal investigation revealed that 78% of SoO-signatory groups in Manipur had expanded their arsenals since 2020, with weapons smuggled from Myanmar’s Sagaing region. The Easter Sunday attacks were carried out using M16 rifles and AK-47 variants—hardly the "personal weapons" permitted under SoO terms.

The Legal Black Hole: SoO’s Jurisdictional Loopholes

The SoO agreements contain a critical clause that has effectively neutered law enforcement: "No criminal proceedings shall be initiated against SoO signatories without prior approval from the Union Home Ministry." In practice, this has meant that even when Kuki militants are identified in attacks—through eyewitness testimony, ballistic evidence, or intercepted communications—local police are powerless to act.

A Connect Quest investigation found that between 2023 and 2026, Manipur Police filed 42 FIRs naming Kuki militant groups in attacks on Naga villages. Not a single case has proceeded to chargesheet. "We’re operating in a Kafkaesque legal limbo," admits a senior Manipur Police officer on condition of anonymity. "The SoO groups know they’re untouchable. The agreement has become a license to kill."

Demographic Warfare: The Kuki Expansion Project and Naga Resistance

The Numbers Behind the Conflict

At its core, the violence in Ukhrul district is a struggle for territory—and the political power that comes with it. The Kuki-Chin-Zomi groups, which constitute approximately 30% of Manipur’s population, have pursued an aggressive settlement expansion strategy since the 1990s. Naga leaders allege this is part of a deliberate "demographic flooding" tactic to alter electoral demographics in the hill districts.

The data reveals a stark pattern: over 25 years, Naga communities have lost 383 sq km of land—an area larger than Mumbai’s municipal limits—to Kuki settlements and "disputed" zones. Satellite imagery from the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) shows that 68% of this land conversion occurred in areas adjacent to SoO militant camps, suggesting coordinated occupation strategies.

The Church as a Battleground

Manipur’s ethnic conflict has acquired a disturbing religious dimension. The Kuki-Chin-Zomi communities, predominantly Christian, have historically aligned with evangelical denominations (notably the Evangelical Baptist Convention), while the Nagas—also Christian—follow a mix of Baptist and indigenous Heraka traditions. The Easter Sunday attacks were not incidental; they represented a calculated strike at the heart of Naga cultural identity.

The National Commission for Minorities has documented 17 cases since 2023 where Kuki militants desecrated Naga churches or disrupted religious gatherings. In December 2025, a group identifying itself as the Kuki National Front (KNF) issued a statement declaring that "Naga religious practices are incompatible with the true Christian faith"—a rhetoric eerily similar to that used in Nigeria’s Middle Belt conflicts.

The State’s Complicity: A Pattern of Deliberate Inaction

Security Forces as Spectators

The Indian government’s response—or lack thereof—has been characterized by what Amnesty International describes as "active passivity." Despite Manipur being one of India’s most militarized states (with one security personnel for every 47 civilians), the pattern of non-intervention during attacks on Naga villages suggests either gross incompetence or tacit approval.

Consider the following:

• Response Time Analysis: In 12 documented attacks on Naga villages, security forces arrived an average of 4 hours and 17 minutes after the first distress call. In contrast, during the 2023 Meitei-Kuki clashes, the average response time was 22 minutes.
• Weapons Recovery: Not a single weapon has been confiscated from SoO groups involved in attacks, despite ballistic evidence linking M16 rifles to KNA cadres.
• Intelligence Failures: The Intelligence Bureau had specific warnings about the Easter Sunday attacks 48 hours in advance, according to leaked documents.

The Political Economy of Inaction

Manipur’s governance crisis cannot be divorced from its political economy. The state’s ₹3,500 crore annual security budget—largely funded by the Centre—has created a perverse incentive structure where prolonged conflict justifies continued funding. A Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report in 2025 revealed that:

• 42% of "peacekeeping" funds were diverted to "infrastructure projects" with no tender processes.
• Assam Rifles spent ₹87 lakh on "community engagement" programs with Kuki groups between 2023-2026, while Naga villages received ₹2.3 lakh in total.
• The Manipur Police’s Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA) unit, supposed to counter insurgency, has not conducted a single operation against SoO groups since 2021.

Regional Reverberations: Why This Crisis Matters Beyond Manipur

The Myanmar Factor: A Transnational Insurgency Nexus

Manipur’s conflict is not contained within its borders. The Kuki-Chin-Zomi groups share ethnic ties with the Chin community in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region, where the Chin National Front (CNF) has been engaged in armed resistance against the junta since the 2021 coup. Indian intelligence sources confirm that:

• At least 1,200 Kuki militants from Manipur have received training in CNF camps in Myanmar’s Kampetlet and Mindat townships.
• The Tiddim Road—a key smuggling route—has seen a 300% increase in arms trafficking since 2023, with M16 rifles (priced at ₹1.2 lakh each in Myanmar) becoming the weapon of choice.
• Myanmar’s junta has allegedly provided "logistical support" to Kuki groups in exchange for intelligence on Indian Army movements near the border.

This transnational dimension raises troubling questions about India’s Act East Policy. As New Delhi deepens engagement with Myanmar’s shadow government (the National Unity Government), its inability to control cross-border militant networks risks undermining its strategic interests in Southeast Asia.

The Naga Peace Accord: A Fraying Consensus

The violence in Ukhrul has sent shockwaves through Nagaland, where the 2015 Framework Agreement between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) and the Government of India already faces implementation delays. Naga civil society groups warn that the attacks in Manipur could derail the peace process entirely.

"If the Indian state cannot protect Naga lives in Manipur, what guarantee do we have for our political future?" asks Niketu Iralu, a senior NSCN-IM leader. The group has hinted at reviving its demand for a "Greater Nagalim"—a sovereign territory encompassing Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh—a prospect that could reignite insurgencies across the Northeast.

The Assam Domino Effect

Assam, which shares a 200 km border with Manipur, has already felt the spillover effects. In March 2026, the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) reported that over 5,000 Kuki families had crossed into Assam’s Dima Hasao and Cachar districts, fleeing retaliatory violence. The Assam government has deployed an additional 2,000 police personnel to prevent "demographic infiltration," but local communities fear a repeat of the 1980s’ Assam Agitation, which left over 3,000 dead.

Paths Forward: Can Accountability Prevail?

Legal Avenues and International Scrutiny

The Naga community’s options for redress are limited but not exhausted:

• Supreme Court Intervention: